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THE MADNESS OF INSANE DELUSIONS 
Kevin Bennardo* 
In the United States, the law of wills professes to be organized around 
the principle of freedom of testation. “Work and earn and save,” it 
says, “so that you can pass your wealth to whomever you please.” 
This principle is attractive, but it simply is not borne out in the 
administration of too many testators’ estates. Rather, judges and 
juries routinely substitute their preferred distributions for testators’ 
expressed preferences. 
One particularly troubling situation arises when testators attempt to 
pass their estates to organizations that champion unpopular beliefs. If 
the deciding judges or juries dislike the testators’ beliefs, they may be 
tempted to invalidate these devises as the product of insane delusions. 
Sometimes these supposed “delusions” have been beliefs about 
divisive social issues—like advancing women in the early twentieth 
century. Other supposed “delusions” have been religious beliefs that 
depart from the mainstream faiths. Allowing judges and juries to label 
these beliefs “delusional” does not further testamentary freedom. 
Rather, it substitutes majoritarian preferences for the counter-
majoritarian views of the testator. This is a dangerous proposition. It 
was once regarded as fact that the Earth was flat. Now the prevalent 
view is that the Earth is round. Should a devise that champions either 
one of those ideas be labeled “delusional”? Unfortunately, the 
outcome may be dictated by the popular opinion of the testator’s 
times. 
                                                                                                            
 *  The Author is a Clinical Associate Professor of Law at the University of North 
Carolina School of Law and a Non-Resident Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the 
Republic of Palau. Thank you to Al Brophy, Alexa Chew, Mark Glover, and John Orth for 
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This Article shares two ideas for reform. First, the doctrine of insane 
delusions should not be applied to devises that seek to advance beliefs, 
ideas, or viewpoints. There is just too great of a risk that judges and 
juries will strike down such devises when the testator’s viewpoints 
diverge from their own. 
Second, the time may have come to admit that the law of wills is not 
as committed to the principle of testamentary freedom as it is often 
espoused to be. The literature is rife with examples of a latent norm of 
familial support. Currently, this norm is expressed when judges and 
juries manipulate flexible doctrines to distribute decedents’ estates to 
decedents’ family members against decedents’ stated preferences. 
Perhaps it is time for the law to expressly acknowledge that familial 
support is important in our society and reserve a share of every 
decedent’s estate for distribution to the decedent’s family. The second 
proposal set forth in this Article, “the forced intestate share,” would 
compel distribution of a portion of each estate to the decedent’s 
intestate takers. Adopting some version of this proposal may actually 
afford testators with greater testamentary freedom overall because, 
by expressly fulfilling the norm of familial support, it would reduce 
decision-makers’ biased tendencies to invalidate devises to nonfamily 
members. Indeed, the counterintuitive solution to achieving greater 
actual testamentary freedom may be to remove testators’ control over 
some share of their estates through a forced intestate share. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Even a first-day student of decedents’ estates class knows that the law of 
wills in the United States is organized around the principle of freedom of 
disposition.1 Subject to limited exceptions, the testator’s wishes trump all else.2 And 
it’s not even close. Sure, other countries have systems that mandate familial support 
by decedents, but not us.3 We’re all about freedom here. Right? 
Well, no. At least, not exactly. By and large, testamentary freedom is not 
about valuing personal choice. Rather, its purpose is to create an incentive for 
individuals to accumulate and conserve wealth and discourage wastefulness.4 
Without testamentary freedom, we are told, individuals would be deterred from 
working and would recklessly spend through their assets.5 
Creating incentives is all about appearances. Credibility, rather than the 
result, is the coin of the realm. Thus, if the goal is truly to create incentives to earn 
and save, then the organizing principle of the law of wills is not achieving the result 
of testamentary freedom. Rather, the organizing principle is creating the appearance 
of testamentary freedom. The appearance of freedom is both sufficient and 
necessary to achieve the goal of incentivizing behavior. Actual freedom is 
unnecessary. 
Placing this subtle lens over the law of wills explains much about how the 
doctrine is actually applied. The administration of the law of wills is at odds with 
the professed theoretical exaltation of testamentary freedom of disposition. The 
disconnect between the theory and the administration creates a con game of sorts. 
It’s a classic bait and switch. “Hey, you, come over here,” beckons the theory. 
“Work and earn and save through your life.” Why? “Because when you die, you 
control what happens to your estate.” So, you buy into the system. You work and 
earn and save, and—ever importantly—you make a will. Then you die. And what 
happens next? Unless your preferences square with the prevailing societal norms 
regarding familial duty, the administration of the law of wills may do its damnedest 
to undermine your preferred devises. Want to leave your estate to the Flat Earth 
Society? Sorry, but that type of devise just might be deemed the product of an insane 
delusion. After your demise, a judge or jury may well decide to invalidate the devise 
and distribute your estate to the natural objects of your bounty instead. By that point, 
you won’t be around to cause a fuss.6 
                                                                                                            
 1. See Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates: Implementing Freedom of 
Disposition, 58 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 643, 643 (2014) (suggesting that a trusts and estates course 
can be organized around the principle of freedom of disposition to match the law’s 
organization around the same principle in this area of the law). 
 2. See infra Section I.A. 
 3. See infra Section I.C. 
 4. See infra Section I.A. 
 5. See infra Section I.A. 
 6. Applying the familiar principle of “once bitten, twice shy,” see, e.g., GREAT 
WHITE, ONCE BITTEN, TWICE SHY (Capitol Records 1989), the testator is necessarily deceased 
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This Article builds upon previous research that has demonstrated that the 
current administration of the law of wills is much more likely to effectuate 
testamentary freedom when a testator’s devises align with cultural norms, 
particularly with the norm of familial support and maintenance.7 Judges and juries 
are simply less likely to carry out devises that depart from the mainstream. If a 
testator wishes to leave her estate to her spouse, her kids, or her siblings, a judge or 
a jury is more likely to carry that out—all in the name of furthering testamentary 
freedom. But if a testator tries to cut close relatives out of her estate plan or to 
distribute her estate in a way that strikes many people as unfair, the result is a much 
higher likelihood that the will or the devise will be found to be invalid.8 Such is not 
a system of true testamentary freedom. 
This Article focuses on abuses of the doctrine of insane delusions.9 If a 
testator wishes to leave her estate to an organization that champions an unpopular 
message, she risks invalidation of the devise as an insane delusion. Such devises that 
sought to advance women or certain nonmainstream religions have been invalidated 
as delusional in the past.10 In our increasingly divided society, there is little to stop 
a judge or jury from labeling all manner of beliefs delusional, be they religious, 
political, or social in nature.11 Selecting which beliefs are “true” and “false” should 
not be the decision-maker’s role, particularly when set against the backdrop of 
testamentary freedom. 
This Article proposes two potential reforms. First, it counsels courts to stop 
applying the doctrine of insane delusions to devises that seek to advance certain 
beliefs or viewpoints.12 Second, it suggests that testamentary freedom may actually 
be advanced by taking away testators’ freedom of disposition over a portion of their 
estates.13 If decision-makers are irreparably biased in favor of devises to close family 
members, then perhaps it is time that the law acknowledges the bias and satiates it. 
To that end, this Article proposes a “forced intestate share,” in which some portion 
(say, 20%) of a testator’s estate would automatically be distributed to the decedent’s 
surviving family members. By forcing the fulfillment of the decision-maker’s 
majoritarian preference for familial support, a system of forced partial intestacy 
would hopefully make the decision-maker more open to fairly assessing and 
carrying out a decedent’s counter-majoritarian devises. In other words, the forced 
intestate share is a tribute—a payment to fulfill the majoritarian sense of familial 
duty—that may actually have the result of increasing the testator’s actual freedom 
of disposition over the rest of her estate. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. First, it provides some necessary 
background on testamentary freedom as the theoretical framework around which the 
                                                                                                            
by the time she is bitten by the administration of the law of wills. Administration of a 
decedent’s estate only occurs once. Thus, she lacks an opportunity to be shy of it in the future. 
 7. See infra Section III.A. 
 8. See infra Section III.A. 
 9. See infra Part II. 
 10. See infra Section II.B. 
 11. See infra Section II.B. 
 12. See infra Section III.A. 
 13. See infra Section III.B. 
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law of estates is supposedly molded in the United States. In Part I, the Article 
identifies the traditional rationales for prioritizing freedom of disposition, notes 
where the law purposefully departs from this rationale, and explains how other 
countries do it differently. Then, Part II chronicles the doctrine of insane delusions, 
particularly how the doctrine is applied to devises that seek to advance specific 
beliefs. Lastly, Part III sets forth the two reforms described in the preceding 
paragraph. 
I. THE APPEARANCE OF TESTAMENTARY FREEDOM 
The law governing decedents’ estates in the United States is obsessed with 
testamentary freedom. The emphasis is on the donor rather than the donee.14 Indeed, 
a donee possesses no cognizable legal rights until after the donor’s demise.15 This 
Part explores the law’s fixation on testamentary freedom and the purposes that this 
freedom is meant to serve. It also identifies exceptions—areas in which a testator’s 
freedom is limited. Finally, it examines systems of succession in other countries to 
highlight the uniqueness of the American fascination with freedom of disposition. 
A. The American Obsession with Testamentary Freedom 
The concept of testamentary freedom is foundational to the law of 
decedents’ estates in the United States.16 It is, after all, the “controlling 
consideration” and the “organizing principle” motivating policy decisions in this 
area of the law.17 As the “first principle of the law of wills,” testamentary freedom 
is paramount.18 Everything else is secondary. Students of decedents’ estates learn it 
on day one,19 and it recurs throughout the doctrine as an ever-ready explanation for 
almost every policy decision in this area of the law.20 
                                                                                                            
 14. Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 644. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, DEAD HANDS: A SOCIAL HISTORY OF WILLS, 
TRUSTS, AND INHERITANCE LAW 19, 46 (2009) (“Freedom of testation is supposed to be the 
guiding principle of modern law. In essence, you can leave your money to anybody you 
choose to leave it to. . . . This is a fundamental principle of law. It is also, apparently, a 
fundamental social norm.”); Mark Glover, A Social Welfare Theory of Inheritance 
Regulation, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 411, 414 & n.5 (referring to testamentary freedom as “the 
bedrock principle in the modern law of succession” and listing supporting sources). 
 17. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 10.1 & cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 18. John H. Langbein, Substantial Compliance with the Wills Act, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 489, 491 (1975). This proposition is so central that Professor Langbein did not even cite 
authority for it. 
 19. See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 644 (noting that “the nature and function of 
freedom of disposition” is one of the topics that ought to be taught “at the outset of the Trusts 
and Estates course”). 
 20. Not all commentators agree that testamentary freedom should be so dominant. 
See, e.g., Jeffrey Evans Stake, Biologically Biased Beneficence, 48 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1101, 1101 
(2016) (identifying testamentary biases and concluding that “testamentary freedom should be 
demoted from the organizing principle to an important consideration in the design of the law 
of succession”). 
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Why testamentary freedom? Freedom of testation is often justified as a 
means to produce net-positive outcomes. In other words, it creates incentives for 
individuals to act in ways that, on the whole, benefit society at large.21 Allowing 
individuals to select their post-death beneficiaries encourages them to work and earn 
and save so that they may pass along their wealth.22 On the donee side, freedom of 
testation creates an incentive for would-be beneficiaries to care for soon-to-be 
decedents in the hope or anticipation of being remembered in the decedent’s will—
or at least not to ignore soon-to-be decedents in the hope of not getting disinherited.23 
Aside from the beneficial incentives, testators are also viewed as having 
superior information regarding how wealth should be divided among family 
members.24 Even if the government wished to pass wealth along family lines, it 
would necessarily have to paint with a broad brush.25 An individual testator, on the 
other hand, knows much more about the intricacies of her family, including which 
potential beneficiaries are in the greatest need or could put a devise to the greatest 
use.26 Additionally, testamentary freedom is also said to produce utility in the form 
of added happiness or gratification during the testator’s lifetime.27 
Finally, as further support for testamentary freedom, commentators have 
observed that lack of testamentary freedom would incentivize all manner of sub-
optimal behavior. If individuals lacked control over the distribution of their estates, 
not only would they lack the incentive to amass sizable estates, but they would 
                                                                                                            
 21. See Mark Glover, Freedom of Inheritance, 2017 UTAH L. REV. 283, 291 
(“[F]reedom of disposition promotes the maximization of societal wealth.”); Adam J. Hirsch, 
Freedom of Testation / Freedom of Contract, 95 MINN. L. REV. 2180, 2186 (2011) (“Whether 
or not we deem it a good per se, economic autonomy facilitates our obtaining other goods.”). 
 22. Glover, supra note 21, at 291; Hirsch, supra note 21, at 2187 (“Giving persons 
the right to make a will therefore encourages them to produce and save more wealth, again 
adding to the sum of capital stock.”). 
 23. Glover, supra note 21, at 291 (“The possibility of disinheritance incentivizes 
the provision of family caregiving, which in turn promotes overall social welfare.”); Hirsch, 
supra note 21, at 2187–88 (“Freedom of testation can simultaneously give rise to a virtual 
market for reciprocal altruistic transfers, beneficiaries providing social services that 
benefactors value in implicit exchange for a share of their estates.”). 
 24. Hirsch, supra note 21, at 2189 (“Assuming a family is tied together by bonds 
of affection, leaving estate plans to owners’ discretion exploits their knowledge (and hence 
their comparative advantage as contrasted with legislators or courts) to devise a plan that 
enhances the family’s welfare.”); Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative 
Theory of the Dead Hand, 68 IND. L.J. 1, 12 (1992) (labeling this the “father knows best” 
hypothesis). 
 25. See Glover, supra note 21, at 290 (“Donors likely have a better understanding 
of how to distribute their wealth upon death in a way that maximizes the utility of donees 
rather than the policymakers who would direct the disposition of estates in the absence of 
freedom of disposition.”). 
 26. See id. 
 27. See id. (“Freedom of disposition could . . . be explained as promoting social 
welfare by providing a source of happiness and satisfaction to individual donors.”); Hirsch, 
supra note 21, at 2187 (“Although benefactors cannot share in a beneficiary’s utility from an 
inheritance at the time of its receipt, they can envision it, and derive present utility from its 
anticipation.”). 
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actually be incentivized to spend their wealth down to zero or to take back control 
by giving away their wealth through inter vivos transfers.28 If this practice were not 
perfectly timed, the result would be the impoverishment of a large number of elderly 
individuals who gave their wealth away too hastily as lifetime gifts. Such an 
outcome would not be viewed positively by the society that would then take up 
supporting them through tax-funded social benefits.29 Thus, freedom of testation 
makes it more likely that individuals will hold onto their wealth long enough to 
support themselves through the ends of their lives. 
In fostering testamentary freedom, the law of wills occasionally goes 
beyond simply effectuating a decedent’s expressed intent. In certain situations, the 
law guesses at a testator’s likely preferences and carries them out, particularly when 
a will—a “delayed-action document”—has grown stale in the wake of more recent 
developments.30 In these matters, the law is guided by its best guesses at the likely 
preferences of the typical decedent. The law will intervene to alter the distribution 
of the testator’s estate when it is deemed likely that the testator wished to update her 
estate plan but simply did not.31 For example, a spouse or issue acquired by the 
testator after the execution of the testator’s will is deemed “pretermitted.”32 Unless 
the testator has indicated otherwise, a portion of the estate will be distributed to a 
pretermitted spouse or issue even though they were not mentioned in the testator’s 
will.33 In a similar vein, divorce revokes any devise made to a former spouse (and 
potentially to a former spouse’s relatives), even when the testator takes no 
affirmative steps to revise the will after the divorce.34 These types of alterations are 
thought to effectuate the results most in keeping with the typical testator’s intent—
in effect, the law presumes that the testator simply failed to keep her estate plan up 
to date with her preferences.35 
                                                                                                            
 28. See Glover, supra note 21, at 288 (“Even if the law attempted to sever[e]ly 
limit the ability to dispose of property upon death, for example by eliminating disposition of 
property by will, people would find ways around these limitations, such as by transferring 
property during life or by other means designed to transfer property at death.”); Hirsch & 
Wang, supra note 24, at 11. 
 29. See, e.g., Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform,  
107 HARV. L. REV. 2013, 2013 (1994) (discussing the vilification of welfare recipients and 
the welfare system). 
 30. John V. Orth, Second Thoughts in the Law of Property, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 65, 
71 (2006); see also Kevin Bennardo, Slaying Contingent Beneficiaries, 24 U. MIAMI BUS. L. 
REV. 31, 42–43 (2015). 
 31. See Bennardo, supra note 30, at 42. 
 32. Id. at 44. The construction of the term issue has prompted considerable debate. 
See Merrill I. Schnebly, Testamentary Gifts to “Issue,” 35 YALE L.J. 571, 571 (1926). 
However, it is generally understood to simply mean an individual’s descendants. E.g., UNIF. 
PROBATE CODE § 1-201(24) (amended 2010). 
 33. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-301(b) (spouses), 2-302 (issue) (amended 2010). 
 34. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-804(b)(1) (amended 2010). 
 35. See, e.g., Gier v. Deoneseus (In re Estate of Deoneseus), 906 P.2d 922, 923 
(Wash. 1995) (stating that the purpose of pretermitted-spouse provisions is “to prevent the 
unintentional disinheritance of the surviving spouse of a testator who marries after making a 
will and then dies without ever changing it”). 
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B. Exceptions to Testamentary Freedom 
Of course, the law does not grant a testator unlimited freedom of 
distribution. There are some devises that simply will not be sustained, no matter how 
clearly communicated.36 Devises that conflict with other strongly held public 
policies will not be upheld.37 For example, the law will not give effect to conditions 
on devises that restrict marital freedom or encourage illegal behavior.38 In almost 
every state, a testator is not permitted to leave her estate to her slayer.39 While the 
general rule that a slayer may not inherit from her victim is partially grounded in the 
concept of testamentary freedom—the typical decedent likely would not want to 
leave her estate to her slayer but lacks the time and opportunity to update her will as 
she is being slayed—the law goes one step further and makes the rule a mandatory 
one unalterable by the decedent.40 Thus, the law will not carry out a devise 
commanding the distribution of assets to a particular beneficiary “even if he kills 
me.”41 This result, which runs contrary to testamentary freedom, is supported by the 
equitable doctrine that a wrongdoer may not profit from her wrong.42 
A decedent’s surviving spouse is protected from total disinheritance.43 
Aside from the spouse, however, U.S. law does not expressly protect other family 
members. A testator is free to disinherit children, including minor children.44 While 
this extreme level of testamentary freedom has been criticized, especially as applied 
to minor children—whom parents have a legal obligation to support while the 
parents are alive45—such freedom persists in the United States. The one exception 
is Louisiana where, under the civil law tradition, children may only be disinherited 
for just cause.46 Elsewhere in this country, testamentary freedom gives way only to 
the spouse; all other relatives take only at the testator’s fancy. 
                                                                                                            
 36. See Orth, supra note 30, at 73 (“[I]n some cases the testator’s actual intention 
is known, not merely presumed, but crossed nonetheless.”). 
 37. See Ronald J. Scalise Jr., Public Policy and Antisocial Testators, 32 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1315, 1326–32 (2011). 
 38. See id. (overviewing kinds of conditions placed on devises that have been held 
to be contrary to public policy). 
 39. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-803(b) (amended 2010). 
 40. See Bennardo, supra note 30, at 37–38. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. at 38–39. 
 43. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010). Protection of surviving 
spouses is described infra in Subsection III.B.2. 
 44. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & ROBERT H. SITKOFF, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 
556 (9th ed. 2013). 
 45. See Stake, supra note 20, at 1117–18 (“For decades, American academics have 
argued to no avail that states should do more to protect children from disinheritance.”); see 
also Glover, supra note 16, at 442 (“The donor’s discretion to disinherit children stands in 
stark contrast with her legal obligation to support her minor children during life. . . . [B]y 
dying with an estate plan that omits her minor children, the donor can shift the cost of child 
support from herself to others.”). 
 46. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1621 (Westlaw through 2018 1st Extraordinary Sess.). 
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C. A Comparative Perspective from Abroad 
Most other countries don’t do it this way. American law “embraces 
freedom of disposition, authorizing dead hand control, to an extent that is unique 
among modern legal systems.”47 As Professor Melanie Leslie pointedly put it, “[t]he 
United States alone insists on paying lip service to the idea that testamentary 
freedom is preeminent.”48 Other countries’ testamentary systems are not obsessed 
solely with elevating freedom of testation, but rather balance freedom of testation 
against family-support obligations. In most Western countries, a significant portion 
of a decedent’s estate will be distributed to the family of the decedent, even if that 
result runs counter to the distributive intent manifested in the decedent’s will.49 This 
is true of both common law and civil law countries.50 
In common law countries, these rules generally take the form of family-
maintenance statutes.51 Such statutes do not reserve a specific portion of the 
decedent’s estate for children, spouses, or other heirs, but rather grant discretion to 
the court to deviate from the terms of the will in order to make the distribution more 
equitable in support of eligible claimants.52 For example, in England and Wales, a 
family member53 who was financially supported by the decedent “may apply to the 
court for an order for ‘reasonable financial provision’ out of the deceased’s estate if, 
by reason of the deceased’s will or intestacy, they do not receive reasonable financial 
                                                                                                            
 47. Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 643–44. 
 48. Melanie B. Leslie, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 235, 
273 (1996). 
 49. Id. at 270 (“Most other Western countries expressly acknowledge a strong 
public policy of restricting freedom of testation to protect dependents, family members and 
others who are viewed as having a claim on a decedent’s assets.”); Ralph C. Brashier, 
Disinheritance and the Modern Family, 45 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 83, 117 n.111 (1994) (“Most 
of the civilized countries in the world provide direct protection from disinheritance to children 
of a testator.”). 
 50. See Ray D. Madoff, A Tale of Two Countries: Comparing the Law of 
Inheritance in Two Seemingly Opposite Systems, 37 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 333, 336 
(2014) (“[M]ost of the common law countries other than the United States have modified their 
laws to provide greater protection for families by enacting family maintenance statutes.”); 
Brashier, supra note 49, at 117 (“Forced heirship is a characteristic of the laws of succession 
in civil law countries . . . .”). 
 51. See RAY D. MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW 59 (2010); Leslie, supra 
note 48, at 270–73 (summarizing family-protection systems in England and Canada); 
Brashier, supra note 49, at 121–22 & n.128 (chronicling the history of family-maintenance 
statutes from New Zealand, England, Australia, and Canada); Stake, supra note 20,  
at 1116–17. 
 52. See MADOFF, supra note 51, at 59–60 (overviewing the English family-
maintenance system); Brashier, supra note 49, at 124–25 (observing that the English family-
maintenance statute “effectively permits a judge not only to alter the testamentary wishes of 
the decedent, but also to do so in a highly discretionary manner” with no “well-defined 
guidelines”). 
 53. Or a person with whom the decedent had a family-like relationship. See John 
Wood, England and Wales, in INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSION 255, 260–61 (Louis Garb & John 
Wood, eds., 4th ed. 2015) (listing eligible relationships). 
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provision.”54 The court then has the authority to order that a portion of the estate be 
distributed to the applicant.55 
On the other hand, civil law countries typically protect descendants from 
disinheritance through forced heirship (also known as forced succession).56 For 
example, in France “[t]he legal right to an inheritance is one of the cornerstones” of 
the law of succession.57 This focus on the beneficiary’s right to inherit stands in stark 
contrast to the American focus on the decedent’s right to bequeath. French law 
strikes a balance that places much more emphasis on the donee side of the equation. 
Under this system, the estate is divided among the “disposable share” and 
“compulsory shares.”58 French decedents have freedom to direct the disposition only 
of the disposable shares of their estates.59 Compulsory shares are generally reserved 
for the decedent’s direct descendants and can consume up to three-quarters of the 
estate.60 Thus, a testator may control as little as one-quarter of the estate. 
II. INSANE DELUSIONS 
Under the Uniform Probate Code, a “sound mind” is necessary to make a 
will.61 Every state and territory has adopted a similar requirement.62 The threshold 
                                                                                                            
 54. Id. at 261. 
 55. Id. 
 56. MADOFF, supra note 51, at 58–59; see also Brashier, supra note 49, at 117–21 
(overviewing forced heirship in France and Louisiana); Ryan McLearen, Comment, 
International Forced Heirship: Concerns and Issues with European Forced Heirship Claims, 
3 EST. PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 323, 326–28 (2011) (overviewing forced heirship in France, 
Germany, and Italy). 
 57. Frank Lipworth et al., France, in INTERNATIONAL SUCCESSION 275, 280 (Louis 
Garb & John Wood, eds., 4th ed. 2015). 
 58. Id. at 280–81. 
 59. Id. at 281. 
 60. Id. The compulsory share is one-half if the decedent has one child, two-thirds 
if the decedent has two children, and three-quarters if the decedent has three or more children. 
Id. A surviving spouse is only due a one-quarter compulsory share, and only if the decedent 
lacked any surviving descendants. Id. Subject to some exceptions, however, a surviving 
spouse is entitled to half of the couple’s community property. Id. at 283. 
 61. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-501 (amended 2010) (“An individual 18 or more 
years of age who is of sound mind may make a will.”). 
 62. Of 55 domestic jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia, Guam, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands), 48 have adopted a 
“sound mind” as the required mental capacity. See ALA. CODE § 43-8-130 (1982); ALASKA 
STAT. § 13.12.501 (1996); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-2501 (1994); ARK. CODE ANN.  
§ 28-25-101 (1949); CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100(a) (2009); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-11-501 
(1994); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-250 (1988); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 201 (1995); D.C. 
CODE § 18-102 (1976); FLA. STAT. § 732.501 (2002); 15 GUAM CODE ANN. § 101(a) (1970); 
HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-501 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 15-2-501 (1971); 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. 
5/4-1 (2016); IND. CODE § 29-1-5-1 (1953); IOWA CODE § 633.264 (2006); KAN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 59-601 (1939); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 394.020 (West, Westlaw through certain laws 
effective July 14, 2018); ME. STAT. tit. 18-a, § 2-501 (1981); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 190B,  
§ 2-501 (2008); MINN. STAT. § 524.2-501 (1975); MISS. CODE ANN. § 91-5-1 (1973); MO. 
REV. STAT. § 474.310 (1999); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-521 (1993); NEB. REV. STAT.  
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for general testamentary capacity is low, but it is skewed in favor of familial support. 
A testator will be deemed mentally incapable of drafting a valid will if she cannot 
recognize her property or her family members as the natural objects of her bounty.63 
These are the only mistaken beliefs that will automatically lead to the invalidation 
of an entire will. Even grossly mistaken beliefs regarding other aspects of the 
testator’s world will not lead to a finding of lack of mental capacity.64 In effect, the 
law assumes that a testator should want to leave assets to her family, and if she 
cannot recognize her family then the entire estate plan is invalid. But if the testator 
is mistaken about other topics that are presumably less important to estate planning, 
the plan is not necessarily invalidated. This is an example of a doctrine that reflects 
using familial support as the norm, rather than taking a truly neutral approach to 
testamentary freedom. 
While mental incapacity will invalidate a testator’s entire will, an insane 
delusion on a particular topic will only invalidate specific devises that were the 
                                                                                                            
§ 30-2326 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 133.020 (1957); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 3B:3-1 (2005); N.Y. 
EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 3-1.1 (1966); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 31-1 (2012); N.D. CENT. 
CODE § 30.1-08-01 (1973); 8 N. MAR. I. CODE § 2301 (through PL 20-59), 
http://cnmilaw.org/pdf/cmc_section/T8/2301.pdf; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2107.02 (2012); 
OKLA. STAT. tit. 84, § 41 (1992); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 122.225 (West, Westlaw through 
2018 Reg. Sess. Emergency Legis.); 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2501 (1976); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 
31, §§ 2111, 2112 (1930); S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-2-501 (2013); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS  
§ 29A-2-501 (1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-1-102 (1941); TEX. EST. CODE ANN. § 251.001 
(2017); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-501 (1998); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 1 (2017); V.I. CODE 
ANN. tit. 15, § 7 (1957); VA. CODE ANN. § 64.2-401 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE § 11.12.010 
(1970); W. VA. CODE § 41-1-2 (1957); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 853.01 (West, Westlaw through 
2017 Act 367); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 2-6-101 (1980). 
  Of the remaining seven states, two set the standard at a “sane mind.” N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 551:1 (Westlaw through 2018 Reg. Sess.); 33 R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-5-2 (1988). 
Maryland requires a testator to be “legally competent.” MD. CODE ANN., EST. & TRUSTS  
§ 4-101 (1974). New Mexico requires a testator to “hav[e] capacity.” N.M. STAT. ANN.  
§ 45-2A-3 (1991). Georgia disallows testation by those “laboring under some legal disability 
arising either from a want of capacity or a want of perfect liberty of action.” GA. CODE ANN. 
§ 53-4-10 (1996); see also GA. CODE ANN. § 53-4-11(a) (1996) (defining testamentary 
capacity as “a decided and rational desire as to the disposition of property”). The sole civil 
code state, Louisiana, requires that the testator “be able to comprehend generally the nature 
and consequences of the disposition that he is making.” LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art 1477 (1991). 
Michigan has some of the most detailed statutory law in this area, enumerating four conditions 
for mental capacity in the testamentary context. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 700.2501 (2009); see 
also CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100.5 (1995) (enumerating circumstances that disqualify an 
individual from mental competence to make a will). 
 63. See Adam J. Hirsch, Testation and the Mind, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 285, 
330 (2017) (“The sound mind doctrine tests testators’ abilities to recognize the people to 
whom, and the property with which, they might wish to bequeath. The doctrine is 
unconcerned with the loss of ability to recognize other things.”). 
 64. Id. As stated by one court, mistaken beliefs on “racial, religious, economic, or 
medical questions” have no bearing on a testator’s mental capacity to make a will “[s]o 
long . . . as the natural objects of one’s bounty are not members of the race, or sect, against 
which the prejudice is directed.” Newman v. Dixon Bank & Tr. Co., 265 S.W. 456, 458 (Ky. 
Ct. App. 1924). 
 
612 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:3 
product of the delusion.65 The doctrine of insane delusions rarely appears directly in 
the statutory law but is instead developed through judicial decisions.66 The 
commentary to the Restatement (Third) of Property provides the majority rule for 
insane delusions: 
An insane delusion is a belief that is so against the evidence and 
reason that it must be the product of derangement. A belief 
resulting from a process of reasoning from existing facts is not an 
insane delusion, even though the reasoning is imperfect or the 
conclusion illogical. Mere eccentricity does not constitute an 
insane delusion.67 
An insane delusion is different than a mere mistaken belief in that “[a] mistake is 
susceptible to correction if the testator is told the truth,” but an insane delusion is an 
erroneous belief “to which the testator adheres against all evidence and reason to the 
contrary.”68 If an insane delusion is detected, the remedy is not to invalidate the 
entire will. Rather, the particular devise is invalid “to the extent that it was the 
product of an insane delusion.”69 Thus, to invalidate a devise under the doctrine of 
insane delusions, the party contesting the will must show both that the testator 
suffered from an insane delusion and that the delusion caused the contested devise.70 
                                                                                                            
 65. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 274–75. 
 66. California is the rare state that includes the concept of insane delusions directly 
in its statutory code rather than as merely an interpretation of the general statutory “sound 
mind” necessary for testation. CAL. PROB. CODE § 6100.5(a)(2) (1995) (declaring an 
individual not mentally competent to make a will if “[t]he individual suffers from a mental 
disorder with symptoms including delusions or hallucinations, which delusions or 
hallucinations result in the individual’s devising property in a way which, except for the 
existence of the delusions or hallucinations, the individual would not have done”). 
 67. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 68. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275. In the majority of jurisdictions, 
a run-of-the-mill testator’s mistake will not be corrected, although both the Restatement and 
Uniform Probate Code permit reformation if there is clear and convincing evidence that the 
terms of the will run counter to the testator’s intent. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: 
WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 12.1 (AM. LAW INST. 2003); UNIF. PROBATE CODE 
§ 2-805 (amended 2010); Hirsch, supra note 63, at 315–18 (discussing various jurisdictions’ 
approaches to mistakes in wills). 
 69. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS 
§ 8.1 cmt. s (AM. LAW INST. 2003). 
 70. E.g., DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275. To borrow one court’s 
colorful illustration: 
It would thus not be sufficient, to avoid a will, to show that the testator 
believed that the moon was made of green cheese, but if it should be 
established, in addition thereto, that because of this belief he devised or 
bequeathed his property in a way which, saving for the belief, he would 
not have done, a case is presented where the abnormality of mind has a 
direct influence upon the testamentary act. 
Hartung v. Homes (In re Chevallier’s Estate), 113 P. 130, 133 (Cal. 1911). 
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A. Devises Premised on Delusions Regarding Familial Relationships 
Typically, an insane delusion involves a false belief about a member of a 
person’s family.71 A testator might be delusionally committed to the belief that his 
or her spouse was unfaithful.72 Or to the belief that he did not father his children.73 
Or to the belief that her heir or caretaker was attempting to poison or otherwise harm 
her.74 Thus, the testator might seek to disinherit a child or spouse based on such 
delusions. Such beliefs—about relations within particular families—do not interest 
society at large. 
A primary concern behind these cases is that the testator has selected 
among the natural objects of her bounty based on a false belief that is the product of 
mental illness. The results can lead to patently inequitable distributions—
prioritizing certain close relatives over others for reasons not grounded in reality. 
The unfairness may be especially acute when the snubbed family member provided 
care to the decedent.75 Although these fact patterns occupy the heartland of insane 
delusion cases, they are not this Article’s focus. Rather, this Article focuses on the 
disquieting hinterland of insane-delusion jurisprudence. 
B. Devises Seeking to Advance “Peculiar” Beliefs 
In an unsettling body of case law, courts have applied the doctrine of insane 
delusions to testators’ attempts to advance beliefs or sets of beliefs. These beliefs 
are not of the intra-family-drama variety, for which society has no prevalent 
viewpoint.76 Rather, the beliefs that get called into question as delusional are beliefs 
that run counter to prevailing views of the time. 
The textbook example (literally taken from the leading textbook) of 
labeling a counter-majoritarian belief as an “insane delusion” is In re Strittmater’s 
Estate, a 1947 decision of the Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey (the 
                                                                                                            
 71. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275; see, e.g., In re Dankbar,  
430 N.W.2d 124, 130 (Iowa 1988) (testator held a “fixed, false belief that her father was an 
alcoholic who emotionally abused her as a child and ultimately ruined her life”). 
 72. See Joshua Tate, Personal Reality: Delusion in Law and Science, 49 CONN. L. 
REV. 891, 906–10 (2017) (summarizing cases); Bradley E.S. Fogel, The Completely Insane 
Law of Partial Insanity: The Impact of Monomania on Testamentary Capacity, 42 REAL PROP. 
PROB. & TR. J. 67, 88–89, 95 (2007) (summarizing cases). 
 73. See Tate, supra note 72, at 906–09 (summarizing cases). 
 74. See id. at 922–23 (describing M.I. Marshall & Isley Tr. Co. of Ariz. v. 
McCannon (In re Killen), 937 P.2d 1368 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1996)); Fogel, supra note 72,  
at 102–03 (same). 
 75. For instance, in Killen, the testator suffered from delusions that three of her 
four nieces and nephews were attempting to harm her by sprinkling parasites and chemicals 
on her from above. 937 P.2d at 1370. The record reflected that those same nieces and nephews 
actually cared for the testator. Id. In her will, the testator left the majority of her estate to the 
nephew about whom she had no delusions and a dollar apiece to the other three. Id. at 1369. 
The appellate court affirmed the invalidation of the will because the testator’s “insane 
delusions focused on natural objects of her bounty and thus materially affected her disposition 
of her property.” Id. at 1374. 
 76. Society lacks an opinion on whether Uncle Henry was faithful to Aunt Sally 
or whether Billy was actually fathered by the mailman. 
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predecessor to the current state supreme court).77 The will of Louisa Strittmater left 
her estate to the National Woman’s Party.78 Her only living relatives were some 
cousins whom she rarely saw.79 The trial court set aside the devise as an insane 
delusion, finding that it was the product of an “insane hatred” of men.80 According 
to the court, Strittmater suffered from “feminism to a neurotic extreme” and 
harbored a “morbid aversion to men” that included “look[ing] forward to the day 
when women would bear children without the aid of men, and all males would be 
put to death at birth.”81 The high court of New Jersey affirmed the finding that the 
devise was the product of an insane delusion, and thus the estate was distributed to 
Strittmater’s cousins instead.82 
To summarize: Strittmater was a woman in a legal era dominated by men. 
Her “delusion” was simply that she did not like men very much, and that belief 
caused her to leave her estate to an organization devoted to advancing women. This 
action does not seem particularly objectionable, especially when viewed through the 
lens of using the law of wills to effectuate the decedent’s intent. Instead, 
Strittmater’s devise was likely invalidated because it offended the decision-makers 
who evaluated it after her death.83 This type of bias furthers societal norms rather 
than testamentary freedom. 
Another troublesome area is religion, especially when the testator’s 
religious beliefs diverge from the mainstream faiths. The doctrine of insane 
delusions is a hazard to fringe religious beliefs, even (or especially) when they are 
truly and dearly held. This result is especially troubling given the common mantra 
that religious beliefs are irrelevant as evidence of mental capacity to make a will.84 
                                                                                                            
 77. In re Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d 205 (N.J. 1947), reproduced in part in 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 275–77. 
 78. Strittmater’s Estate, 53 A.2d at 205. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 205–06. 
 81. Id. at 205. 
 82. Id. at 206. 
 83. For those bothered by the court’s ill treatment of the Strittmater testator’s dim 
view of men, a somewhat satisfying corollary may be found in Joslyn v. Sedam, 7 Ohio Dec. 
Reprint 350 (Ohio Dist. Ct. 1877). The Joslyn testator harbored a delusion that all women 
were prostitutes and could support themselves “out of the wages of sin.” Id. at 353. As a 
result, he left a disproportionately large amount of his estate to his son rather than his two 
daughters who, like all women, he believed to be prostitutes. Id. The will was set aside based 
on a finding that the testator was laboring under both mental incapacity and the undue 
influence of his son. As a result, the three children inherited the estate in equal shares. Id. at 
350–51. 
 84. See, e.g., Belz v. Piepenbrink, 149 N.E. 483, 485 (Ill. 1925) (“The belief of a 
person upon religious or political questions cannot be made a test of his sanity.”); Nalty’s 
Adm’r v. Franzman’s Ex’r, 299 S.W. 585, 585 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927) (“A belief in the doctrines 
of Mohammed, Confucius, Zoroaster, or any other doctrine or religion, may not be offered as 
evidence on the question of testamentary capacity.”). But see Davis’ Ex’r v. Laughlin,  
133 S.W.2d 544, 546 (Ky. Ct. App. 1939) (stating that evidence that testator had embraced 
Catholicism in the final months of her life after a lifetime of great antipathy toward Catholics 
was competent evidence of lack of mental capacity to make a will). 
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It is generally quite easy for a court to find that religious beliefs do not bear 
on mental capacity when the will is not influenced by those beliefs.85 After all, a 
devise must be the product of an insane delusion for the doctrine to invalidate it.86 
But when particular devises are premised on religious beliefs, testators risk 
offending the decision-makers’ sensibilities and prompting the invalidation of the 
religiously motivated devise. 
An insane delusion must, by definition, be an erroneous belief. Thus, the 
soundest approach for courts to take when considering religious beliefs is simply to 
confess that “[t]he truth or falsity of a religious belief is beyond the scope of a 
judicial inquiry.”87 There is, quite literally, “no test (known to men) by which it can 
be tried and its truth or falsity demonstrated.”88 
                                                                                                            
 85. See, e.g., Buchanan v. Pierie, 54 A. 583, 585 (Pa. 1903) (“[W]hile the testator 
held firmly to the conviction that he could, through mediums, communicate with the spirits 
of the departed, and particularly with the spirit of his dead son, yet it does not appear that he 
believed or ever admitted that he was influenced in any way by the spirits in the preparation 
of his will.”); In re Randall, 59 A. 552, 553 (Me. 1904) (“Some persons believe they have 
communications from and interviews with the spirits of deceased persons. This may be a 
delusion, and is so regarded by many; but, unless such supposed communications control the 
disposition of property, the believer in them is not thereby rendered incompetent to make a 
valid will.”). 
 86. See supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
 87. In re Brush’s Will, 72 N.Y.S. 421, 425 (N.Y. Surr. Ct. 1901) (finding that a 
testator’s devise of the bulk of her estate to a Christian Science church was not the product of 
an insane delusion); see also Scott v. Scott, 72 N.E. 708, 710 (Ill. 1904) (overturning jury’s 
invalidation of a will that contained devises designed to advance the writings of Emanuel 
Swedenborg: “[A] belief in Swedenborgianism, and enthusiasm manifested in propagating 
that faith, furnish no evidence of monomania, insane delusion, or insanity.”). 
 88. In re Elston’s Estate, 262 P.2d 148, 150 (Okla. 1953) (“[N]o creed or religious 
belief, in so far as it pertains to an existence after death, can be regarded as a delusion . . . . ”). 
As the Supreme Court of Tennessee put it: 
We can comprehend the delusion of the man who fancied he was Jesus 
Christ, and kindly extended his forgiveness when asked, saying, I am the 
Christ; also his, who imagined he corresponded with a princess in cherry 
juice, who dreamed dreams, and heard voices directing him to burn York 
Minster church. But we can not comprehend a delusion upon a point of 
belief as to the nature of future rewards and punishments [in the afterlife], 
and the principles of justice upon which they will be distributed. This is a 
subject beyond the ken of mortal man, and in one sense of the word, 
perhaps, every individual is laboring under a delusion who attempts to 
solve it. Yet there is no subject we are more disposed to theorize about, 
and about which there is no greater conflict of opinion. The fool hath said 
in his heart there is no God; and of course no future rewards and 
punishments [in the afterlife]; a dreadful error, yet no one apprehends that 
it amounts to insanity, and that he has not a disposing mind [sufficient to 
make a will]. The Turk looks to his heaven of sensual enjoyment, the 
Christian to his intellectual points of faith, differing as widely as the 
sources of their religion. Delusion in its legal sense can not be predicated 
of either, and indeed of no creed upon the subject, because there is no test 
by which it can be tried. 
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Other courts are not so open-minded about religious beliefs. A devise 
premised on a nonmainstream religious belief can lead to its invalidation.89 
Believers in Spiritualism—communications with the dead—once faced particular 
hostility from the decision-makers. Devises have been invalidated for establishing 
Spiritualist churches and libraries,90 for founding a home for poor and aged 
mediums,91 and for the benefit of “spiritualist work” by the National Spiritualists’ 
Association of the United States.92 Courts have gone as far as to say that any will 
that is the product of a belief in Spiritualism is invalid.93 
The Supreme Court of Washington offered its views on devises based on 
“peculiar” religious beliefs in the case of Ingersoll v. Gourley: 
[W]hile testamentary capacity is not to be measured by religious 
belief or opinions, yet if these opinions are of a nature which 
produces a will which is wholly the result of them, in other words, 
if the will in question would not have been made if the testator 
                                                                                                            
Gass’ Heirs v. Gass’ Ex’rs, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 278, 284 (1842) (emphasis added). 
 89. As one court stated: 
A man may be insane about his religion, as well as about any other subject. 
If he believes and practices things in connection with a religion which he 
accepts and to which a substantial number of people adhere, which things 
are contrary to the experiences of normal human life, and contrary to the 
practices and beliefs of such religion, such beliefs and practice may be 
shown as proof of mental incapacity. Insane delusions may, and do, exist 
about religion, and it would be unsound to hold that, if a man was mentally 
unbalanced about his religion, such mental state, and his acts, words, and 
conduct flowing therefrom, might not be proven as evidence on the 
question of his testamentary capacity. There is a clear distinction between 
a religious belief and insane delusions. 
Nalty’s Adm’r v. Franzman’s Ex’r, 299 S.W. 585, 585–86 (Ky. Ct. App. 1927). 
 90. Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1055–56 (Ill. 1907) (reversing jury’s 
finding that testator lacked testamentary capacity where will devised bulk of estate to establish 
a Spiritualist church and library). 
 91. O’Dell v. Goff, 112 N.W. 736, 738 (Mich. 1907) (finding that evidence 
supported jury’s finding that testator’s “mind dwelt upon the subject of Spiritualism so 
persistently and profoundly as to make him incapable of reasoning” and thus either lacking 
in mental capacity to make a will or subject to undue influence from spiritualistic 
communications, where testator devised bulk of estate for the purpose of founding, building, 
and equipping a home for poor and aged spiritual mediums). 
 92. Irwin v. Lattin, 135 N.W. 759, 763 (S.D. 1912) (affirming trial court’s denial 
of probate based on a finding that “testatrix was possessed of the belief that she had frequent 
and continual communication with departed spirits . . . and that she had been directed by said 
spirits to give and bequeath all her property to the Spiritualists’ Association”). 
 93. In re Rohe’s Will, 50 N.Y.S. 392, 395 (Sur. Ct. 1898) (“The will of one who 
believes in Spiritism is not on that account void, nor is it evidence of mental unsoundness. It 
must be shown, in order to avoid a will on that account, that it was the offspring of such 
belief.”); see also Compton v. Smith, 150 S.W.2d 657, 660 (Ky. Ct. App. 1941) (“[I]t is 
likewise true that a normal belief in spiritualism is not evidence of insanity, unless such belief 
is possessed to the extent that it destroys the will power and overcomes it or indulged in to 
such an extent as to indicate insane delusions.” (internal citation omitted)). 
 
2018] INSANE DELUSIONS 617 
had not entertained some peculiar religious belief, his 
testamentary capacity may well be doubted.94 
The Ingersoll testator bequeathed half of his estate to Thomas Gourley to be held 
“in trust for the benefit and use of widows, orphans, and deserving poor.”95 Gourley 
was the founder of a religious sect known as the Saints of the Lord, which was 
“peculiar” in the eyes of the court.96 As a result, the court invalidated the devise, 
finding that the testator was “the victim of a morbid and insane delusion as to the 
power, and mission of Gourley, believing him to be possessed of superhuman 
attributes and powers and charged with a mission beyond that committed to ordinary 
men . . . .”97 In doing so, the court implicitly ruled that the testator’s religious belief 
was erroneous. Such treatment appears to be reserved only for religious beliefs that 
are deemed to be “peculiar.” 
III. TWO IDEAS FOR REFORM 
Our society professes to prize testamentary freedom, but our courts rankle 
at actually carrying out this freedom when faced with bequests that run counter to 
societal preferences. This Part lays out two proposed reforms, the first of which 
focuses on the threat of applying the doctrine of insane delusions to devises that seek 
to advance unpopular viewpoints. The proposed reform is simply to shrink the 
doctrine and refrain from applying it to this category of devises. 
The second proposal addresses the greater challenge of aligning estate 
administration generally with the latent societal preference that decedents pass 
wealth to their families. Currently, this norm rears its head on an ad hoc basis when 
courts and juries manipulate flexible doctrines to invalidate devises with which they 
disagree. The second proposal suggests that it may be more straightforward to 
simply recognize expressly that inheritance by family is an important societal norm 
and require that decedents leave some share of their estates to family members. 
Doing so would pay tribute to the norm of familial support and potentially make 
judges and juries less likely to invalidate devises to nonfamily members. Although 
testators would be denied freedom over a portion of their estates, that restriction may 
actually result in greater overall testamentary freedom in the form of less meddling 
by judges and juries. These proposals are not mutually exclusive—courts could 
implement the former, and legislatures could implement the latter. 
A. Refrain from Applying Insane Delusions to Devises that Seek to Advance 
Beliefs 
The doctrine of insane delusions simply should not be applied to devises 
that seek to advance particular beliefs. These devises are distinct from the mine-run 
insane-delusion cases in which testators suffer from delusions that affect their 
relationships with the natural objects of their bounties. Moreover, the threat of 
                                                                                                            
 94. Ingersoll v. Gourley, 139 P. 207, 209 (Wash. 1914). 
 95. Id. at 208. 
 96. Id. Among other tenets, the Saints of the Lord apparently believed that Gourley 
could work miracles and was a steward sent by God to distribute his followers’ property to 
the poor. Id. 
 97. Id. at 209. 
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judges and juries importing their own subjective viewpoints and cultural norms is 
especially acute when testators seek to advance a fringe belief.98 
A court should not place itself in the role of arbiter of truths, particularly 
when the disputed issue is one of belief. What one person regards as a “truth” another 
may consider an opinion or belief. There are many deeply held beliefs that are not 
uniformly held by all members of society. Whether these beliefs constitute truths or 
delusions should not be the province of courts. Many would think that denial of 
climate change or evolution is delusional given the scientific evidence to the 
contrary. Or that subscription to particular political or economic theories is 
delusional. But should a devise to an organization that champions these beliefs be 
invalidated as an insane delusion? If so, then testators only possess testamentary 
freedom to the extent that their views are noncontrarian. 
As a hypothetical, take the professed beliefs of Kyrie Irving, an all-star in 
the National Basketball Association.99 He believes—or at least has professed to 
believe—that the Earth is flat.100 Assume for sake of this hypothetical that it is a 
deeply held belief that he clings to beyond all evidence to the contrary, and it causes 
him to devise a portion of his estate to the Flat Earth Society.101 Should that devise 
                                                                                                            
 98. See supra Section II.B. 
 99. Irving, who was educated at Duke University, is a member of the Boston 
Celtics. As a member of the Cleveland Cavaliers, he scored the winning shot in game seven 
of the 2016 NBA Finals. See BRIAN WINDHORST & DAVE MCMENAMIN, RETURN OF THE KING: 
LEBRON JAMES, THE CLEVELAND CAVALIERS AND THE GREATEST COMEBACK IN NBA HISTORY 
237–38 (2017). 
 100. Irving first publicly espoused this belief during a podcast interview with his 
former teammates, Richard Jefferson and Channing Frye. Road Trippin’ with RJ & Channing: 
Episode 7: Kyrie Irving – DEEP in thought 30,000 Feet High Above, YOUTUBE (Feb. 17, 
2017) at 15:43, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mzjL9JxSFAk. There has been some 
speculation that Irving’s statements were meant to be a commentary on the media or a call 
for people to challenge deeply ingrained beliefs rather than a reflection of his actual beliefs 
on the Earth’s lack of roundness. See, e.g., NBA Commissioner Adam Silver Has Fun with 
Kyrie Irving’s Flat-Earth Comments at All-Star Press Conference (Feb. 18, 2017), available 
at http://www.nba.com/article/2017/02/18/commissioner-adam-silver-all-star-press-
conference (quoting NBA Commissioner Adam Silver as saying that Irving “was trying to be 
provocative and I think it was effective”). It has been reported that Irving’s statements 
contributed to a recent wave of flat-Earth believers among U.S. middle-school students. See 
Avi Wolfman-Arent, The Ongoing Battle Between Science Teachers and Fake News, NPR 
(July 28, 2017, 6:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/ed/2017/07/28/537907951/the-
ongoing-battle-between-science-teachers-and-fake-news; Matt Bonesteel, Kyrie Irving’s 
Flat-Earth Beliefs Now the Bane of Middle-School Teachers, WASH. POST (July 28, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/early-lead/wp/2017/07/28/kyrie-irvings-flat-earth-
beliefs-now-the-bane-of-middle-school-teachers. 
 101. See generally THE FLAT EARTH SOC’Y, https://www.tfes.org/ (last visited Aug. 
2, 2017); see also Press Release, The Flat Earth Society, The Flat Earth Society Officially 
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be invalidated as the product of an insane delusion?102 If he did the same thing in 
the year 1491, the answer would assuredly be no, as a flat Earth was the prevailing 
belief at the time. But today, the prevailing belief in society is that the Earth is not 
flat, and the outcome could very well be the invalidation of the devise. 
Some people follow the Harry Potter books as religious texts.103 Others 
find religious guidance in the Bible. Qualitatively, there is little to separate the two 
as religious texts: both books describe events that are fantastical, given the daily 
experiences of millions of humans. The only meaningful difference is the number 
of followers. It is not hard to imagine, however, that a court or jury would be much 
quicker to deem a literal belief in Harry Potter’s struggles with Voldemort to be an 
insane delusion than it would be to deem a literal belief in Noah’s experiences with 
the flood. This outcome—labeling a belief in Hermione Granger as delusional but a 
belief in a wooden ship full of animals as beyond the reach of judicial inquiry—is 
not based on anything other than majoritarian preferences and biases against 
“peculiar” beliefs.104 
Hostility toward “peculiar” beliefs has been well documented in other areas 
of estate administration. Indeed, biases are bound to emerge whenever judgment is 
involved.105 Decision-makers are constantly tempted to review the equity of a 
testator’s distributions and reform them to align with the decision-maker’s own 
notions of fairness and appropriate behavior.106 This temptation may reflect the 
                                                                                                            
 102. This is a pure hypothetical. The Author has no knowledge of Irving’s intended 
estate plan. 
 103. HARRY POTTER AND THE SACRED TEXT, 
http://www.harrypottersacredtext.com/ (last visited Aug. 3, 2017); see also Cristela Guerra, 
Could ‘Harry Potter’ Give Rise to a New Religion?, BOS. GLOBE (Sept. 22, 2016), 
https://www.bostonglobe.com/lifestyle/2016/09/22/could-harry-potter-give-rise-new-
religion/WIAWQ431SNS2E8KFNlOaiP/story.html. 
 104. The same could be said for the followers of Jediism, a faith grounded in the 
Star Wars franchise. See, e.g., Tim Donnelly, Thousands of people have converted to the Jedi 
faith, N.Y. POST (Dec. 14, 2015), https://nypost.com/2015/12/14/the-jedi-faith-is-very-real-
and-its-surging-in-popularity/; Tom de Castella, Have Jedi Created a New ‘Religion’?, BBC 
NEWS MAG. (Oct. 25, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-29753530. 
 105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 696 (8th ed. 
2011) (“There is no doubt a paternalistic streak in decisions by courts to disregard the terms 
in a will.”); Jane B. Baron, Empathy, Subjectivity, and Testamentary Capacity, 24 SAN DIEGO 
L. REV. 1043, 1043 (1987) (“[I]f values are truly individual, empathy is problematic: the best 
faith attempts to understand another person may fail—indeed, they are probably doomed to 
fail. In such instances, we are left to impose our wishes and values on the testator instead of 
effectuating the testator’s own desires.”). 
 106. See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 649 (“Judges and juries may be tempted to find 
undue influence or incapacity if the testator’s dispositions seem unfair or unnatural.”). Note 
that a different set of considerations is at play when a group’s mission is itself illegal. In that 
situation, the invalidity of the bequest stems not just from a philosophical disagreement 
between the testator and the decision-maker, but from an actual tension between the stated 
policy objective of the group and the stated policy of the government as expressed in the 
criminal law. See McCorkill v. McCorkill Estate, 2014 N.B.R. 2d 148 (N.B. Ct. of Queen’s 
Bench 2014) (voiding a devise to a neo-Nazi group because the documented objectives and 
activities of the group were illegal and violative of public policy). 
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belief that the often-elderly individuals who make wills lack sound judgment107 or 
simply a recognition that the testator is no longer around to make a fuss. In the words 
of the Supreme Court of Illinois, “It is a constantly recurring source of error in will 
cases that there is a strong inclination in courts, and especially in juries, to do by 
their judgments or verdicts what they would have advised, had the testator consulted 
them beforehand.”108 
Thus, there is at least a serious tension—and at most an all-out conflict—
between the theoretical underpinning of testamentary freedom and the practical 
administration of decision-makers bending pliable doctrines to effectuate their own 
preferred outcomes at the expense of the testator’s expressed preferences. Certain 
doctrines profess to facilitate testamentary freedom, but in operation, they can be 
used to frustrate it. In particular, the doctrines of undue influence, testamentary 
incapacity, and fraud have been identified as prone to abuse.109 Undue influence, in 
particular, has been singled out as a particularly effective tool for assisting decision-
makers in reforming decedents’ estate plans.110 
Commentators have forcefully noted that such abuse is generally reserved 
for devises that break from social norms.111 This poses a challenge to the entire 
premise of testamentary freedom: if testators are only “free” to arrange their estate 
plans in ways that conform to societal norms, then testators lack actual freedom. 
They only possess the appearance of freedom. But because most testators devise 
their estate plans in ways that align with societal norms, the lack of true freedom 
goes unrecognized. 
The true test of freedom, of course, occurs when its possessor attempts to 
exercise it by going against the grain.112 Testators who attempt to disregard their 
families and distribute their estates to nonfamily members risk invalidation, 
especially when the testators’ relationships with the recipients run counter to societal 
                                                                                                            
 107. See POSNER, supra note 105, at 696 (noting that “a person’s will is often made 
while he is quite elderly [when] his judgment may not be as sound as it was when he was 
younger”). 
 108. Owen v. Crumbaugh, 81 N.E. 1044, 1055 (Ill. 1907). Similarly, another court 
reversed a jury’s determination in a will contest: 
The verdict in this case can not be accounted for on any theory other than 
prejudice of the jury. The modern tendencies of juries in will contests is 
to be governed by their own notions as to what the will should be, and 
how the testator, according to their individual notions, should have 
disposed of his property. . . . The only theory upon which the verdict can 
be accounted for was the bias and prejudice of the jury. 
Bd. of Foreign Missions of Presbyterian Church v. Bevan, 24 Ohio C.D. 318, 326 (Ct. App. 
1913) (jury had invalidated testator’s will where it devised a portion of his estate to the Board 
of Foreign Missions of the Presbyterian Church rather than to his wife and son). 
 109. See infra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 110. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
 111. See infra notes 116–17 and accompanying text. 
 112. See Carla Spivack, Why the Testamentary Doctrine of Undue Influence Should 
Be Abolished, 58 KAN. L. REV. 245, 249 (2010) (“The principle of testamentary freedom is 
not necessary to protect conventional bequests that conform to general experience; rather, it 
exists to carry out devises that fail to conform to social norms yet reflect the testator’s will.”). 
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norms.113 For example, certain decision-makers have shown discomfort with devises 
to same-sex partners or much-younger companions.114 
Numerous doctrines that govern testation are flexible by design to 
accommodate the wide range of potential factual scenarios that may arise.115 
Flexible doctrines, however, are prone to manipulation.116 When distributing 
testators’ estates, judges and juries are more likely to validate a will or a devise if it 
conforms with societal norms and expectations regarding distributing assets to close 
family members.117 
In her seminal work, The Myth of Testamentary Freedom, Professor 
Melanie Leslie concluded that “testamentary freedom exists for the vast majority of 
testators who happen to have the same sense of duty and moral obligation that the 
law implicitly imposes—but often not for those who hold non-conforming 
values.”118 Later works have built upon Leslie’s observations and contributed further 
evidence that majoritarian preferences often dictate testamentary outcomes at the 
expense of the testator’s expressed preferences.119 In sum, a devise to a nonfamily 
member is more likely to be invalidated as the product of undue influence, 
testamentary incapacity, or fraud than a similar devise to a family member.120 
                                                                                                            
 113. Irene D. Johnson, There’s a Will, But No Way—Whatever Happened to the 
Doctrine of Testamentary Freedom and What Can (Should) We Do to Restore It?, 4 EST. 
PLAN. & CMTY. PROP. L.J. 105, 108–09 (2011) (“Courts and juries seem loathe to uphold plans 
that do not dispose of the leftover property to ‘the natural objects of the testator’s bounty’—
the testator’s closest family members.”). 
 114. See Spivack, supra note 112, at 276–86 (summarizing cases that betrayed the 
decision-maker’s ideological disapproval of the testator’s relationships); Ray D. Madoff, 
Unmasking Undue Influence, 81 MINN. L. REV. 571, 592–600 (1997) (chronicling the case of 
Weiss v. Kaufmann (In re Kaufmann’s Will), 247 N.Y.S.2d 664 (App. Div. 1964), aff’d 205 
N.E.2d 864 (N.Y. 1965)). 
 115. See Spivack, supra note 112, at 264. 
 116. E. Gary Spitko, Gone But Not Conforming: Protecting the Abhorrent Testator 
from Majoritarian Cultural Norms Through Minority-Culture Arbitration, 49 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 275, 283 (1999) (labeling the doctrines of mental capacity and undue influence 
“sufficiently nebulous that they allow the fact-finder to rewrite the testator’s estate plan in 
accordance with societal norms”). 
 117. Id. at 282 (“The ‘abhorrent’ testator who disinherits her legal spouse or close 
blood relations in favor of, for example, a non-mainstream religion, a radical political 
organization, or a same-sex romantic partner is especially at risk of having her estate plan 
discarded.”). 
 118. Leslie, supra note 48, at 237. 
 119. See Madoff, supra note 114; Spitko, supra note 116. 
 120. See Leslie, supra note 48, at 236–37 (“[C]ourts faced with an offensive will 
often use other doctrines ostensibly designed to ascertain whether the testator formulated 
testamentary intent—doctrines such as capacity, undue influence and fraud—to frustrate the 
testator’s intent and distribute estate assets to family members.”); Leslie, supra note 48, at 
243–58 (exposing how the doctrine of undue influence is manipulated to promote family 
protection and “just results” in the eyes of the decision-maker); Spitko, supra note 116, at 280 
(“[A]ll things being equal, a testamentary disposition favoring family is more likely to survive 
a capacity, undue influence or fraud challenge than is a disposition favoring non-family.”); 
Johnson, supra note 113, at 106 (“[T]estamentary plans that conform to social norms, such as 
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Likewise, an instrument is more likely to be found noncompliant with the requisite 
formalities for making a valid will when it contains bequests that deviate from 
societal norms.121 
Invalidating these devises—or the wills that contain them—often results in 
a family member being substituted as the beneficiary. After devises of specific 
property in a will are carried out, a residuary devise conveys the remainder of the 
testator’s estate.122 Thus, if a particular devise fails, the property falls into the residue 
and is distributed to the beneficiary of the residuary devise.123 That beneficiary is 
often a close family member.124 If there is no residuary devise, or if the residuary 
devise or the entire will is invalidated, the affected property falls into intestacy and 
is practically guaranteed to be distributed to a family member.125 In one example, a 
will that sought to devise the estate in equal parts to three religious organizations 
was invalidated for lack of mental capacity because the testator was found to suffer 
from delusions that “manifested themselves chiefly as religious fanaticism.”126 The 
result was that the estate was distributed, instead, to the decedent’s heirs-in-law.127 
Given decision-makers’ demonstrated preference for inheritance by family 
members, Professor Irene Johnson called freedom of testation “a thing of smoke and 
mirrors, lulling testators into a false sense of security about their testamentary 
plans”128 and observed that “[o]ne begins to wonder why [an individual] should 
write a will at all” given that the results often feel preordained.129 All too often it 
seems that the decision-maker will find one way or another to arrive at the same 
destination—distributing the decedent’s estate to the family. 
The doctrine of insane delusions simply provides judges and juries with 
another tool to impose their own views on testamentary outcomes, and this menace 
is particularly grave when it comes to devises that seek to advance peculiar beliefs. 
                                                                                                            
providing for members of the decedent’s family, are likely to be upheld; while wills that seek 
to dispose of property in a less conventional manner are often defeated on various 
grounds. . . .”). 
 121. See Leslie, supra note 48, at 258–68. In general, a will must be in writing, 
signed by the testator, and either witnessed by at least two individuals or acknowledged by 
the testator before a notary public. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-502(a) (amended 2010). But see 
id. § 2-502(b) (permitting unwitnessed, holographic wills that are written in the hand of the 
testator). 
 122. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 374 (providing the following 
example of a residuary devise: “a devise to A of ‘all of the rest, residue, and remainder of my 
property and estate’”). 
 123. See id. at 351; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-604(a) (amended 2010). 
 124. See MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, JUDITH N. CATES & DAVID T. SMITH, THE FAMILY 
AND INHERITANCE 83-120 (1970) (reporting results of empirical study in which testators 
overwhelmingly left devises to family members); see also DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 
44, at 65. 
 125. See DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 351–52. Intestacy is described 
infra in Subsection III.B.1. 
 126. Hankins v. Mabee (In re Murray’s Estate), 144 P.2d 1016, 1022 (Or. 1944). 
 127. Id. at 1017, 1023. 
 128. Johnson, supra note 113, at 106. 
 129. Id. at 109. 
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Decision-makers often have their own opinions and beliefs on these same topics, 
and the law should not tempt them with the opportunity to prioritize their own beliefs 
over those of the testator. If freedom of testation is the organizing principle, it should 
be a principle that is borne out in how estates are actually administrated on a daily 
basis. 
Society at large (or testators’ families) may deem it “wasteful” for testators 
to spend their estates on advancing viewpoints that are believed to be 
wrongheaded.130 However, there are meaningful differences between spending 
money to advance the theory that the Earth is flat and flushing the money down the 
toilet. Assets that are burned, buried, or drowned no longer contribute to society. 
Razing a house diminishes property value.131 Transferring the house to the Flat Earth 
Society so that it can be sold to generate funds to support flat-Earth messaging does 
not diminish property value. It simply passes the asset through the organization. 
Society is economically no worse off—all that has been generated is some 
propaganda that champions counter-majoritarian ideas.132 
                                                                                                            
 130. The dead hand, for all of its supposed freedoms, lacks the power to destroy. 
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781, 838 (2005) (“As a 
general matter, the law recoils at the idea of allowing the dead hand to destroy property.”); 
see also John H. Langbein, Burn the Rembrandt? Trust Law’s Limits on the Settlor’s Power 
to Direct Investments, 90 B.U. L. REV. 375, 376 n.8 (2010) (collecting cases). As such, the 
living and the dead hand are treated unabashedly unequally: 
This is not a living person who seeks to exercise a right to reshape or 
dispose of her property; instead, it is an attempt by will to confer the power 
to destroy upon an executor who is given no other interest in the property. 
To allow an executor to exercise such power stemming from apparent 
whim and caprice of the testatrix contravenes public policy. 
Eyerman v. Mercantile Tr. Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Surely many 
decedents are buried with some of their personal effects, and some even in their automobiles. 
See MADOFF, supra note 51, at 14 & 158 n.4 (describing decedents whose requests to be 
buried in their cars were followed); see also Noam Kutler, Note, Protecting Your Online You: 
A New Approach to Handling Your Online Persona After Death, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
1641, 1663 (2011). But this practice is best viewed as an acquiescence by the living rather 
than a power of the dead. 
 The primary justification for this approach is that testators should not have the 
power to destroy property when they will not suffer the economic consequences of its 
destruction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 47 cmt. E (AM. LAW INST. 2003) 
(“Although one may deal capriciously with one’s own property, self-interest ordinarily 
restrains such conduct.”); see also Strahilevitz, supra note 130, at 839–41 (describing and 
criticizing this justification). This approach, of course, diminishes testamentary freedom in 
that it limits what testators may do with their property at death. See Strahilevitz, supra, at 
838–39 (“[T]he law’s resistance to dead hand destruction pushes against the grain of 
American trusts and estates law, which is for the most part relatively deferential to the wishes 
of testators and settlors regarding the disposition of their property.”). 
 131. See Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 213 (finding that razing the house would reduce 
the value of the property from $40,000 to $650 and depreciate neighbors’ property values by 
approximately $10,000). 
 132. A testator could certainly spend her wealth during her lifetime challenging 
round-Earth beliefs. Taking away her ability to do so after death only incentivizes attempts 
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Moreover, the anti-waste doctrine is narrow: it is best applied in situations 
in which assets are literally destroyed. That is a fairly bright-line inquiry that leaves 
very little room for judgment—and therefore little room for bias. Making a 
qualitative judgment that a particular idea is so worthless that propagating it would 
be “wasteful” is a qualitatively different type of decision. It puts the judge or jury in 
the position of determining which ideas are worthwhile and which are not. This 
dangerous proposition would further marginalize minority viewpoints. 
Beliefs evolve. At one time it would have been thought wasteful or 
delusional to spend money to advance the theory that microorganisms called germs 
spread disease.133 At some point, medical science tipped the balance: germ theory 
became the favored view, and its opponents were the erroneous ones.134 For the great 
many of us, however, even such “proven facts” are taken as a matter of faith. I 
believe that the world is round and microorganisms spread contagions, but I haven’t 
independently verified those claims. My ancestors likely were equally assured of the 
contrary perspective. The law of wills—a body of law organized around freedom of 
testation—should not impose prevailing, contemporary views on all testators. 
Rather, it should cast a big enough tent to accommodate devises that champion 
causes or perspectives that are unpopular or uncomfortable to society at large. 
Because the doctrine of insane delusions is not expressly written into 
statutes,135 the reform need not be a legislative one. Instead, courts can—and 
should—refuse to apply the doctrine to devises that seek to advance a particular set 
of beliefs. Even in cases that do not involve such devises, courts should be mindful 
about how they describe the doctrine. Appellate courts should not describe it so 
broadly that it could be wielded in future cases as a tool to further majoritarian bias 
and marginalize counter-majoritarian beliefs. A simple, clarifying comment should 
be added to the Restatement to guide courts in this respect. 
B. Further Unshackling the Dead Hand 
In addition to the above suggestion targeted at the doctrine of insane 
delusions, the law of wills needs broader reform to guard against decision-maker 
bias. As explained above, it has long been observed that decision-makers manipulate 
flexible doctrines to attain distributions that accord with the decision-makers’ 
preferences.136 This biased administration of estates undermines freedom of 
testation. 
                                                                                                            
to circumvent the probate process through inter vivos wealth transfers—for example, making 
a large gift to the Flat Earth Society during life to ensure that it is not frustrated after death. 
 133. See ROBERT P. GAYNES, GERM THEORY: MEDICAL PIONEERS IN INFECTIOUS 
DISEASES 89–90, 159–61 (2011). 
 134. See id. at 312 (“Despite infectious diseases claiming countless lives from 
prehistoric times, the theory of ‘contagion’ due to living entities, i.e., the germ theory, is a 
relatively recent one in the annals of Western medicine.”). 
 135. See supra note 66 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra Section III.A. 
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Commentators have urged that the doctrines most prone to abuse—like 
undue influence—should simply be abolished.137 Indeed, I just urged the same thing 
regarding a portion of the doctrine of insane delusions.138 However, the answer to 
the overarching problem of decision-maker bias cannot be to simply abolish all of 
the abused doctrines. Rather, it may be time for the law of wills to admit that freedom 
of testation is not the whole deal and that society harbors a very powerful preference 
for distributions to family. Acknowledging that norm allows for the law to expressly 
account for it instead of pushing it to the sidelines for decision-makers to apply on 
an ad hoc basis. 
The discussion below sets forth a proposal for a “forced intestate share.” 
The forced-intestate-share proposal extends and modifies the familiar concept of 
providing an elective share for surviving spouses.139 In short, the forced intestate 
share is simply setting aside a certain share of every estate that must be transferred 
as though the decedent died intestate. It is a tribute to be paid to the decedent’s 
family. By paying that tribute and satisfying the societal norm of familial support, 
however, the decedent may be able to purchase something closer to true 
testamentary freedom over the remainder of the estate. In other words, requiring 
that, say, 20% of the estate must go to close family members may reduce the 
likelihood that judges and juries will invalidate the other 80% of the estate plan 
based on bias. 
The following Subsections explain the intestate system, the elective share, 
and how the two can be combined into a workable framework that safeguards 
freedom of testation by acknowledging a societal preference for familial support. 
1. Intestacy Explained 
When a decedent dies intestate—without a will—the estate is distributed 
according to the plan set forth in the state’s intestacy statute. An intestacy statute 
creates an “estate plan by default” that seeks to effectuate the likely desired estate 
plan of the typical intestate decedent.140 The intestate system is premised on 
approximating freedom of distribution by attempting to construct the estate plan that 
a typical decedent would have wanted, had she bothered to write it down.141 
In an attempt to fulfill majoritarian preferences, intestacy statutes prioritize 
distributions to close relatives and then, in the absence of surviving members at each 
                                                                                                            
 137. See Spivack, supra note 112, at 245 (arguing that historical, doctrinal, and 
psychological objections all warrant the abandonment of the doctrine of undue influence). 
 138. See supra Section III.A. 
 139. See infra Subsection III.B.2. 
 140. DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 63. 
 141. See Lawrence W. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal 
Rights Under the Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 IOWA L. REV. 223, 230 (1991) (“Various 
considerations drive the formulation of intestate-succession laws. The most obvious and 
perhaps predominant consideration is the decedent’s intention. Of course, the law gives effect 
to intention by imputation.”). 
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layer of distribution, expand out to distributions to more distant relatives.142 For 
example, a surviving spouse will always take a significant portion of an estate—and 
oftentimes, the entire estate—through intestacy.143 In the absence of a surviving 
spouse, surviving descendants inherit the estate.144 If the decedent leaves no 
surviving spouse or descendants, the decedent’s parents will inherit the estate.145 
And so forth and so on. The intricate web of intestacy law spirals out—through 
spouses, descendants, ancestors, and collateral kin—until it reaches the point at 
which the likely preferences of the typical intestate decedent can no longer be 
presumed.146 That outer limit of many intestacy statutes is the decedent’s 
grandparents and their descendants.147 
If the decedent was not survived by any relatives who are qualified to take 
under the intestacy statute, then the decedent’s estate escheats to the state—meaning 
that it is forfeited to the government.148 This final fallback position is not designed 
to carry out the decedent’s likely intent—few decedents would be gratified by 
watching their estates being turned over to the government149—but rather is 
necessary to facilitate a workable intestacy system.150 Once the outer bounds of 
distant relatives are surpassed, the estate simply has to go somewhere, and the 
                                                                                                            
 142. UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 2-102, 2-103 (amended 2010); see Bennardo, supra 
note 30, at 40–42 (summarizing order of intestate distributions under the Uniform Probate 
Code). 
 143. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-102(1) (amended 2010). 
 144. Id. § 2-103(a)(1). But see id. § 2-102(3), (4) (providing a share of the intestate 
estate to surviving descendants in certain circumstances in which the decedent also leaves a 
surviving spouse). 
 145. Id. § 2-103(a)(2). 
 146. Inheritance by very distant relatives creates the situation of the laughing 
heir—an inheritance that creates a pecuniary windfall for the heir but no accompanying grief. 
See, e.g., In re MacCarthy’s Estate, 17 Pa. D & C.3d. 600, 614 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. 1980) 
(labeling potential laughing heirs as those relatives “who had so little interest in decedent and 
so little contact with him that they did not concern themselves for many years as to whether 
he was living or dead”); David F. Cavers, Change in the American Family and the “Laughing 
Heir”, 20 IOWA L. REV. 203, 208 (1935) (defining a laughing heir as “succession by one who 
is so loosely linked to his ancestor as to suffer no sense of bereavement at his loss . . . .”). But 
see John V. Orth, “The Laughing Heir” What’s So Funny?, 48 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 
321, 324 (2013) (pointing out that emotional reaction is not a prerequisite to inheritance). 
 147. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(4), (5) (amended 2010). Certain states extend 
inheritance rights to more distant relatives or certain classes of nonrelatives. See Bennardo, 
supra note 30, at 42 n.56 (listing statutes). 
 148. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-105 (amended 2010). See generally John V. Orth, 
Escheat: Is the State the Last Heir?, 13 GREEN BAG 2D 73 (2009). 
 149. Orth, supra note 146, at 324. 
 150. See David C. Auten, Note, Modern Rationales of Escheat, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 
95, 96 (1963) (“[T]he best [rationale] is that no reasonable alternative disposition has been 
proposed.”); Julia M. Melius, Note, Was South Dakota Deprived of $3.2 Million? Intestacy, 
Escheat, and the Statutory Power to Disinherit in the Estate of Jetter, 44 S.D. L. REV. 49, 73 
(1999) (“The state does not take by intestate succession as the last heir of the decedent, but 
rather, because there are no heirs capable of taking.”). 
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government—the ultimate benefactor of the public—is viewed as a sensible resting 
place.151 
2. The Elective Share Explained 
Despite the principle of testamentary freedom, a testator may not totally 
disinherit her spouse, no matter how clearly she manifests that intent. A surviving 
spouse may always “elect” to renounce the portion left to her in the decedent’s will 
and instead take a statutory share of the decedent’s estate.152 This statutory share is 
known as the elective share.153 As formulated by the Uniform Probate Code, the 
elective share recognizes both a partnership theory of marital-wealth accumulation 
and a support obligation between spouses.154 The partnership theory presumes that 
spouses intend to pool their fortunes on an equal basis and recognizes the 
restitutionary entitlement of both spouses to an equal share of marital property.155 
The support-obligation theory, on the other hand, recognizes that mutual duties of 
spousal support should continue, in some form, after death.156 
Two preliminary determinations are required to calculate the surviving 
spouse’s elective share: the augmented estate and the marital-property portion.157 
The augmented estate is meant to capture the couple’s combined assets.158 The 
augmented estate is the sum of the following values: the value of the decedent’s net 
probate estate, the value of the decedent’s nonprobate transfers (to both the surviving 
spouse and to others),159 and the value of the surviving spouse’s net assets at the 
time of the decedent’s death (including nonprobate transfers to others).160 The 
marital-property portion is a scaled percentage based on the length of the marriage 
that approximates the portion of the augmented estate that is attributable to the 
                                                                                                            
 151. See Auten, supra note 150, at 116 (declaring that, lacking heirs, “the state is 
the only reasonable taker”). 
 152. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 (amended 2010). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202 cmt. (amended 2010). 
 155. UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 71 (amended 2010). The 
partnership theory of marriage is also known as the “marital-sharing theory.” Id. 
 156. Id. at 79. A useful way to conceptualize the difference between the two 
theories is to consider a very short marriage and a very long marriage. Under the partnership 
theory, the surviving spouse of a very short marriage would be entitled to very little because 
very little of the decedent’s wealth was accumulated during the marriage. See id. at 74. But 
in the case of a very long marriage in which the couple’s wealth was mostly accumulated 
during the course of the marriage, the partnership theory would support an entitlement by the 
surviving spouse to a large portion of the decedent’s estate. See id. at 73–74. The support-
obligation theory, on the other hand, makes no distinction between long and short marriages. 
Id. at 80 (“In implementing a support rationale, the length of the marriage is quite 
irrelevant.”). Rather, the support obligation exists equally between all spouses. 
 157. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202(a) (amended 2010). 
 158. Id. art. II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 75. 
 159. Nonprobate transfers are distributions that are made outside of the probate 
context, such as payments made through trusts, life insurance, and pay-on-death and 
retirement accounts. See Sitkoff, supra note 1, at 654. 
 160. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(a) (amended 2010); UNIF. PROBATE CODE art. 
II, pt. 2 general cmt. at 75-76. 
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marriage.161 At the low end of the scale, the marital-property portion of the 
augmented estate is only 3% for marriages that lasted less than one year before the 
decedent’s demise.162 At the high end, the marital-property portion is 100% of the 
augmented estate for marriages of 15 years or more.163 Once the marital-property 
portion of the augmented estate is identified, the elective share is simply half of that 
amount.164 
Setting the elective share at 50% of the value of the marital-property 
portion of the augmented estate satisfies the partnership theory’s view of equal 
entitlement to wealth accumulated during the marriage. In recognition of the support 
obligation, the Uniform Probate Code also provides for a supplemental elective-
share amount, which is only activated when the surviving spouse’s assets and other 
entitlements fall below a floor of $75,000.165 In this way, the Uniform Probate 
Code’s approach to the elective share combines aspects of both the partnership and 
support-obligation theories of marriage. 
When a surviving spouse claims an elective share, the elective share is first 
satisfied by amounts that pass to the surviving spouse under the will, through 
intestacy, or through nonprobate transfers as well as by the marital-property portion 
of the surviving spouse’s property and nonprobate transfers to others.166 If that 
amount fails to fulfill the elective share, the surviving spouse may claim the 
unsatisfied balance from the remainder of the decedent’s estate.167 Other devises and 
nonprobate transfers are proportionately abated to satisfy the remainder of the 
surviving spouse’s elective share.168 
3. Purchasing Freedom Through the Forced Intestate Share 
As chronicled above, devises that deviate from majoritarian cultural norms 
are more likely to be invalidated than those that do not.169 The result is often to cast 
the entire estate into the intestate system, which calls for it to be distributed to the 
decedent’s closest surviving relatives.170 Alternatively, the invalidation of a single 
devise (while upholding the rest of the will) results in the assets from that devise 
falling into the residuary devise and, again, often passing to family.171 
                                                                                                            
 161. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-203(b). 
 162. Id. § 2-203(b) alt. A. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. § 2-202(a); see also id. art. II, pt. 2 gen. cmt. at 76. For example, consider 
the death of a spouse after ten years of marriage with an augmented estate of $500,000. The 
marital-property portion of the augmented estate for a marriage of that length is 60% 
($300,000). Id. § 2-203(b) alt. A. The surviving spouse’s elective share would be half of this 
amount ($150,000). Id. § 2-202(a). 
 165. Id. § 2-202(b) & cmt. 
 166. Id. § 2-209(a). 
 167. Id. § 2-209(c). 
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra Section III.A. 
 170. See supra notes 122–25 and accompanying text. 
 171. If there is no residuary devise, the assets from the invalidated devise would 
fall into intestacy. See supra note 125 and accompanying text. 
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Under the current system, the decision-maker faces a binary decision: 
uphold a devise or invalidate it. There is no halfway option that allows for the 
decision-maker to make a Solomonian-like decree to split the baby.172 A devise 
cannot be reformed to conform partially to the decision-maker’s preferences and 
partially to the testator’s preferences.173 A distribution that is viewed as inequitable 
cannot be brought just a tad bit more in line with societal norms. It must either be 
followed or disregarded. 
Consider an unmarried testator who left the entirety of her estate to the Flat 
Earth Society and nothing to her two children. Upon the testator’s death, the children 
challenge the will. The judge or jury decision-maker, thinking it unfair that the 
testator failed to provide for her family, may well be tempted to invalidate the devise 
(or the entire will) on the basis of insane delusion or testamentary incapacity (or 
fraud or undue influence or failure to conform with all of the formalities necessary 
to make a valid will). The result of invalidation would be to cast the estate into 
intestacy, thereby distributing it in equal portions to the decedent’s two children.174 
This result is undeniably at odds with the testator’s expressed wishes. But carrying 
out the devise to the Flat Earth Society is at odds with societal norms and, 
assumedly, most decision-makers’ preferences. For the decision-maker, the stakes 
                                                                                                            
 172. That is not so in every area of the law. For example, in criminal law, a jury 
may decide to find a defendant guilty of a lesser-included offense as a compromise between 
a finding of guilt on the most serious charge and an acquittal. See, e.g., State v. Porter,  
639 So.2d 1137, 1144 (La. 1994) (“[T]he lesser verdicts which were returned indicated the 
jury’s refusal to accept unconditionally the victim’s version of the events.”). This middle 
pathway allows a jury to balance competing interests by partially nullifying and partially 
sustaining the prosecution. Interestingly, this type of jury nullification is often viewed as 
“antimajoritarian.” Stacey P. Eilbaum, Note, The Dual Face of the American Jury: The 
Antiauthoritarian and Antimajoritarian Hero and Villain in American Law and Legal 
Scholarship, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 711, 725 (2013) (“When courts directly address the issue 
of jury nullification, they often describe the jury as an antimajoritarian institution, a rogue 
minority of individuals who have usurped the power of the legislature by nullifying laws 
enacted by an elected, representative body.”). In the criminal system, even more balancing 
occurs during sentencing when the decision-maker exercises discretion in selecting a 
punishment from within a statutory range. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2012) (requiring 
the court to impose a sentence “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to achieve the 
enumerated goals of punishment). 
 173. Although the decision-maker cannot strike a compromise, the parties can. 
Settling an estate by agreement is an option, especially when the outcome is unclear. See, e.g., 
Lenoir Rhyne Coll. v. Thorne, 185 S.E.2d 303, 307 (N.C. Ct. App. 1971) (affirming trial 
court’s approval of a settlement agreement because “a bona fide controversy existed as to 
whether the holographic document being offered for probate was a valid codicil”). Indeed, 
informal distribution by agreement may, in fact, be the most common method of distributing 
decedents’ estates. Robert A. Stein & Ian G. Fierstein, The Demography of Probate 
Administration, 15 U. BALT. L. REV. 54, 60 (1985) (finding empirically that “the percentage 
of all decedents who leave estates that undergo administration proceedings is not high”); see 
STEWART E. STERK, MELANIE B. LESLIE & JOEL C. DOBRIS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS 45 (4th ed. 
2011) (“If the beneficiaries, however, were all content to divide Jane’s property informally 
(presumably in accordance with the will), no formal legal action would be necessary.”). 
 174. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(1) (amended 2010). 
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are all or nothing: either 100% honor the counter-majoritarian devise to the Flat 
Earth Society or 100% invalidate it and replace it with an intestate distribution to 
the decedent’s children. What if there was another way? 
Forcing an intestate share may actually further testamentary freedom. In 
the above scenario, the decision-maker may well invalidate the devise, and the 
testator’s expressed preference would be totally frustrated. But what if the law 
required the distribution of 20% of a decedent’s estate to whomever would take 
through intestacy? In that scenario, 20% of the estate would be split among the 
decedent’s children in equal shares. That may well satiate the decision-maker’s 
notion of sufficient familial support. With that thirst quenched, the decision-maker 
may be less likely to manipulate another doctrine to invalidate the devise to the Flat 
Earth Society. Thus, with 20% of the estate going to close family, the decision-
maker may be willing to allow the other 80% to pass to the Flat Earth Society in 
accordance with the testator’s expressed wishes. By taking away testamentary 
freedom over 20% of the estate, the law could potentially better achieve actual 
testamentary freedom over the remaining 80%. 
The current system of testation in the United States professes to largely 
ignore familial support as a goal, instead preferring to espouse testamentary freedom 
as the organizing principle.175 But the biases of decision-makers have demonstrated 
that familial support is a latent norm in our society’s approach to decedents’ 
estates.176 Instead of ignoring this norm, the law of testation could pay it its due—
not necessarily because familial support is good or right or just, but because it is 
going to express itself in jury verdicts and judicial outcomes one way or another. 
Currently, it expresses itself by manipulating flexible doctrines—like mental 
incapacity, undue influence, and fraud—in order to invalidate nonconforming 
devises in favor of distributions to close family members. This system of ad hoc 
enforcement occurs in the shadows. To some degree, we have a family-maintenance 
system177 already, but without the family-maintenance statute to authorize it. This 
reality may be surprising to many, given the resistance routinely shown to family-
maintenance systems in this country.178 
                                                                                                            
 175. See supra Section I.A. 
 176. See supra Section III.A. 
 177. As explained above, a family-maintenance statute grants considerable 
discretion to the decision-maker to reform the testator’s will to provide support for various 
members of the testator’s family. See supra Section I.C. 
 178. Granting a court the authority to override a testator’s expressed preferences 
has been called “violat[ive of] our country’s professed belief in freedom of testation” and 
self-determination. Kristine S. Knaplund, Grandparents Raising Grandchildren and the 
Implications for Inheritance, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 16 (2006); see also Brashier, supra note 49, 
at 132–33 (noting that “unguided and unprincipled use of judicial discretion can lead to . . . 
arbitrary and unsatisfactory” results). Additionally, it has been noted that the family-
maintenance system’s flexibility creates costs. See Mary Ann Glendon, Fixed Rules and 
Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession Law, 60 TULANE L. REV. 1165, 1189 
(1986) (“Our American experience with discretionary distribution on divorce should make us 
extremely wary of any system that would encourage a variety of friends and relatives to 
challenge wills and permit a probate judge to rearrange estate plans.”); see also Frances H. 
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A wiser approach may be to simply recognize that familial support is 
important to our society and expressly account for it in our system of decedents’ 
estates.179 Thus, this Article proposes that a share of a testator’s estate be distributed 
to the decedent’s intestate takers—the “forced intestate share.” Let’s say the 
proposed forced intestate share is set at 20%, although that precise percentage is not 
essential to the proposal.180 In the case of a will contest under the forced-intestate-
share system, the court would first determine who would take the decedent’s estate 
under the intestacy statute. Twenty percent of the estate would be required to be 
distributed in accordance with the intestacy statute.181 
Here is an example. Tonya dies and is survived by five siblings: Abraham, 
Bethany, Caitlin, David, and Eleanor. Tonya has no spouse or children; thus, her 
intestate takers are her siblings.182 If she had no will, each sibling would take 20% 
of her estate. But Tonya does have a will. In her will, she leaves her estate in equal 
25% shares to three of her siblings—Abraham, Bethany, Caitlin—and to her one 
friend Francis. Her will makes no provision for David or Eleanor. Under the forced-
intestate-share proposal, 20% of Tonya’s estate would have to be distributed in 
accordance with the intestacy statute. Thus, each of her siblings would be guaranteed 
a distribution of at least 4% of the estate. The court would need to reform the 
distributions to meet the forced intestate shares to ensure that both David and 
Eleanor received their 4% shares. To do so, it would proportionally reduce the four 
devises in the will to meet the obligation. Thus, the shares to Abraham, Bethany, 
Caitlin, and Francis would each be reduced by 2% to create the 4% shares for David 
                                                                                                            
Foster, Linking Support and Inheritance: A New Model from China, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 1199, 
1215 (summarizing predicted costs and criticisms of family-maintenance systems); Michelle 
Harris, Why a Limited Family Maintenance System Could Help American “Grandfamilies”: 
A Response to Kristine Knaplund’s Article on Intestacy Laws and their Implications for 
Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, 3 NAELA J. 239, 252–55 (2007) (same). In short, the 
idea of enacting a family-maintenance statute in the United States is simply a nonstarter. See 
DUKEMINIER & SITKOFF, supra note 44, at 562 (“Although the debate has consumed many 
pages in the law reviews, there is no credible proposal pending in any state in this country to 
adopt a family maintenance system . . . . ”). 
 179. See Johnson, supra note 113, at 120 (noting that, “if providing for dependents 
or close family members is an important social goal,” it would be preferable to do so directly 
rather than doing so through “the current situation in which courts evidence hostility toward 
testamentary plans that do not comport with such social norms”); Spivack, supra note 112, at 
246, 305–07 (“If we care about protecting families, let legislatures institute forced heirship.”). 
 180. Certainly, a different percentage, such as one-quarter or one-third, could be 
workable as well. 
 181. I would not, however, go so far as recommending that the forced intestate share 
extend all the way to escheating a portion of the estate to the government. As noted above, 
the purpose of escheat is not to fulfill the decedent’s likely distributive preferences, but rather 
it is simply administratively necessary to transfer the estate to some entity, and the 
government is the best available option. See supra notes 148–151 and accompanying text. 
Thus, decision-makers are unlikely to manipulate doctrines in order to effectuate escheat. 
Because the principle danger of doctrinal manipulation is not present in these cases, the 
proposed solution is unnecessary. Thus, the proposed system of forced intestacy should not 
operate in cases where the intestate taker would be the government. 
 182. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-103(a)(3) (amended 2010). 
 
632 ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 60:3 
and Eleanor. The final distribution would be 23% each to Abraham, Bethany, 
Caitlin, and Francis and 4% each to David and Eleanor.183 
This type of arrangement would reduce a decision-maker’s temptation to 
invent a reason to invalidate the entire will because it “unfairly” excluded two 
siblings. Ninety-two percent of the estate would go to the intended recipients—
Abraham, Bethany, Caitlin, and Francis. By forcing the distribution of the other 8% 
to unwanted recipients—David and Eleanor—the forced intestate share has 
purchased some insurance against the judge or jury throwing out the entire will 
because it offended the decision-maker’s general sense of moral fairness or familial 
obligation. The judge or jury may now be inclined to say, “At least each sibling got 
something. I’m okay with letting the rest of this will stand.” The net gain to Tonya’s 
testamentary freedom may well outweigh the cost of distributing a small portion of 
the estate to two of her siblings against her expressed wishes. 
While this proposal shares similarities with forced-succession systems in 
civil law countries,184 it is broader because it protects all potential heirs to the full 
extent of the jurisdiction’s intestacy statute, rather than the narrower band of 
descendants protected by most systems of forced succession. For example, the 
forced-succession system in France protects only the decedent’s descendants from 
disinheritance (or the surviving spouse in the absence of descendants).185 Depending 
on the decedent’s family situation and the jurisdiction’s intestacy statute, the forced-
intestate-share proposal could potentially require the distribution of a share of the 
estate to more distant heirs, including ancestors or lateral kin.186 
This proposal also shares similarities with the elective share,187 but again it 
is broader. Through the elective share, however, we already have experience with 
forcing testators to leave portions of their estates to family members. It is not a 
totally foreign concept. We’ve ironed out the mechanics for how to make these 
forced distributions administratively workable in the context of surviving 
spouses.188 The forced intestate share would simply extend a version of the elective-
share system to additional heirs. 
                                                                                                            
 183. Of course, David or Eleanor (or both) could disclaim their 4% shares. They 
are not required to take anything. Thus, in a case in which family circumstances were such 
that a particular distribution was not sensible, the would-be intestate taker could simply 
decline her portion of the forced intestate share. For example, if David was very wealthy and 
close to death, and his will called for his estate to be distributed to his siblings, he may wish 
to disclaim his portion of Tonya’s estate because it would be subject to estate taxes when he 
died. 
 184. See supra Section I.C. 
 185. See supra notes 57–60 and accompanying text. 
 186. See supra Subsection III.B.1. 
 187. See supra Subsection III.B.2. 
 188. See supra Subsection III.B.2. Certainly, a more complex forced-intestate-
share system could be devised that more closely mirrors the elective share system by, for 
example, taking into account nonprobate transfers. The goal of this Article is not to design all 
of the intricacies of the forced-intestate-share system; rather, the goal is to pose the question 
of whether forcing some intestate share would actually increase decedents’ overall freedom 
of testation. 
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In cases of married testators, the intestate taker would be the surviving 
spouse anyway, and the forced intestate share would make up an overlapping portion 
of the elective share. In cases of unmarried testators, the forced intestate share would 
go to the testator’s children, if any exist. This result would alleviate some of the 
concerns of the many critics of the current system in which decedents may cease 
providing for their minor children.189 In most cases, the forced intestate share would 
have no effect on the actual distribution of a testator’s estate because, in most cases, 
a testator will have already provided more for her close family members in her will 
than the forced intestate share requires.190 
It is only those testators who break from societal norms and attempt to 
distribute their estates in counter-majoritarian ways that will be materially affected 
by the forced-intestate-share proposal. But these testators are actually buying 
something with that forced intestate share. They are paying a tribute to the societal 
norm of familial support in exchange for a greater likelihood that the rest of their 
nonconformist estate plans will be left undisturbed. They are giving up a share of 
their alleged testamentary freedom in exchange for something closer to actual 
testamentary freedom with the remainder of their estates.191 
CONCLUSION 
Judges and juries in probate contests have shown themselves biased in 
favor of distributions that align with their preferences. For most folks, this is not a 
problem because they more or less share the same preferences as the decision-maker. 
But for testators who actually seek to exercise their testamentary freedom through 
unpopular devises, this bias often manifests itself to the detriment of their clearly 
expressed testamentary preferences. 
                                                                                                            
 189. See supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 190. See Hirsch & Wang, supra note 24, at 14 (noting that “the majority of 
testators . . . have no desire to make unorthodox bequests”). If Tonya, the testator in the 
example from a few paragraphs above, had left at least 4% of her estate to each of her five 
siblings, then the proposal would have no effect on the distribution. 
 191. Under the current system, counter-majoritarian testators could consider 
forcing something approximating an intestate share onto themselves. In other words, they 
could attempt to purchase some measure of testamentary freedom by leaving a share of their 
estate to surviving family members. A testator who desires to leave her entire estate to a 
controversial organization that contests germ theory may want to consider splitting her estate 
and leave a sizable chunk to her family. Keeping some of the wealth in the family may satisfy 
the judge or jury’s notion of fairness and keep the anti-germ-theory devise from being 
invalidated wholesale. 
 Testators paying tribute to familial support on an ad hoc basis would likely not carry 
the same weight with judges and juries as forcing an intestate share through a statutory reform. 
One of the benefits of enacting it as a statute is that decision-makers will, perhaps, be more 
likely to consider the statutory percentage to be adequate to fulfill the testator’s duty of 
familial support. If, for example, the statute requires 30% of the estate to be distributed in 
intestacy, decision-makers may assume that 30% is a fair and appropriate amount. However, 
if a testator leaves 30% of her estate to her family on her own accord, the decision-maker 
lacks the statutory grounding point. In that situation, the decision-maker may be more likely 
to deem 30% insufficient and more tempted to invalidate the balance of the testator’s devises. 
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This is especially a problem when a testator seeks to devise a portion of the 
estate directly to an organization that champions an unpopular idea. Judges and 
juries are prone to give into the temptation to invalidate such devises and to go so 
far as to label the testator’s unpopular beliefs “delusional.” These types of devises 
should not be invalidated under the doctrine of insane delusions. Instead, devises 
that seek to advance a particular viewpoint should be carried out, no matter whether 
society at large considers the viewpoint wrongheaded. 
Additionally, the time may have come for us to admit that the law of wills 
in the United States is not as committed to the principle of testamentary freedom as 
it often espouses to be. A latent norm of familial support exists and is expressed by 
judges and juries who manipulate flexible doctrines to achieve distributions to the 
decedent’s family members. Instead of relying upon this shadowy system of ad hoc 
enforcement, perhaps it is time for the law to expressly reserve a share of every 
decedent’s estate for distribution to the decedent’s family. The proposal set forth in 
this Article—the forced intestate share—would compel distribution of a portion of 
each estate to the decedent’s intestate takers. Adopting some version of this proposal 
may actually provide testators with greater testamentary freedom overall because, 
by expressly fulfilling the norm of familial support, it would reduce decision-
makers’ biased tendencies to invalidate devises to nonfamily members. Indeed, the 
counterintuitive solution to achieving greater testamentary freedom may actually be 
to remove testators’ control over some share of their estates through a forced 
intestate share. 
 
